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Collaborative carbon emission reduction in supply chains：
an evolutionary game-theoretic study
Abstract
Purpose: This paper employs an emerging phenomenon in China concerning collaborative 
carbon emission reduction (CCER) to investigate: firstly, the coordination of suppliers and 
manufacturers within supply chains to reduce carbon emissions, and secondly, the role of 
governmental policy in facilitating this process.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper draws upon evolutionary game theory (EGT) to 
develop an evolutionary game model for CCER for suppliers and manufacturers within 
supply chains. This includes a detailed analysis of the evolutionary direction and process in 
different areas, both with, and in the absence of, governmental subsidies.
Findings: The results demonstrate that CCER is path dependent and that its evolutionary 
process is influenced by the following four factors: (1) the initial status within supply chains; 
(2) the cost; (3) the additional benefit; and (4) the investment risk related to CCER. The 
research also reveals that the reward provided by manufacturers is rational over the long term, 
due to the excessive cost of incentives potentially preventing the implementation of CCER.
Originality/Value: This study represents the first attempt to investigate CCER within supply 
chains through the application of an evolutionary game-theoretic model. The investigation of 
multiple factors in the model will deepen understanding of the collaborative role required for 
the carbon emission reduction. 
Keywords: collaborative carbon emission reduction; evolutionary game theory; supply 
chains; governmental policy
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1. Introduction
The concept of a Circular Economy (CE) is driven by the skills required for a more 
sustainable economy and, as such, has attracted growing attention from a variety of 
stakeholders, i.e. governments, communities and customers (Geissdoerfer et al., 2017; 
Genovese et al., 2017). CE is designed to eliminate waste through cycles of assembly, use, 
disassembly and reuse, with virtually no leakages from the system, in terms of disposal or 
recycling (Spring and Araujo, 2017). However, CE can have an unintended negative impact 
on business sustainability. The recycling and reuse of certain materials demands the redesign 
of a product, including for manufacturers to replace many materials with those that are 
eco-friendly, while also modifying aspects of their processes to reuse certain materials. These 
actions can have a potentially negative impact on the environment, particularly as inefficient 
technologies employed in processing these new materials can lead to increased consumption 
of energy (Gurtoo and Antony, 2007). This is exemplified by Knight et al. (2005), who 
compared the environmental effect of wooden and steel doors, identifying that, while the 
reuse of steel saves wood, the processing involved in steel doors leads to a significant 
increase in energy consumption and environmental pollution. Therefore, in order to build 
greater CE, it is essential for businesses to improve their ability to reduce carbon emissions 
(European Climate Foundation, 2018).
The reduction of carbon emission can create a more effective CE by helping firms to 
conserve energy and manufacture more environmentally-friendly products (Bansal and 
Hoffmann, 2012). In addition, decarbonisation can assist companies in increasing market 
demand and reducing their production costs in emerging economy, such as China. For 
example, in response to these benefits, the Chinese government has dedicated itself to the 
design of a penalty mechanism, i.e. cap-and-trade, aimed at m tivating firms to invest in 
carbon reduction technologies (Liu et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2016). 
However, manufacturers are prevented from reducing the carbon emissions in an 
effective manner by a number of obstacles, i.e. high operational costs and the high demand 
for sustainable technologies. As identified by Huang et al. (2016), some companies, 
particularly those based in China, face additional obstacles to the reduction of carbon 
emissions, including: (1) insufficient enforcement; (2) insufficient levels of information; and 
(3) insufficient regulation systems. A manufacturer can seek help from supply chains to 
overcome these obstacles and achieve its sustainability objectives in a more efficient manner, 
i.e. a collaborative management of reducing carbon emissions (Chaabane et al., 2012). 
Theißen et al. (2014) indicated that collaborative carbon reduction in supply chains can result 
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in a greater reduction of energy costs for suppliers and manufacturers, as well as satisfying 
the expectations of their customers, thus improving their reputation and alleviating the risks 
associated with climate change. This finding has been supported by industrial practices, with 
Walmart launching a sustainability platform to eliminate one gigaton of emissions in its 
global supply chains by the end of 2030 (Walmart, 2017) and further multi-national 
corporations (e.g. IBM) focussing on supporting their suppliers to develop and implement 
approaches to the reduction of carbon emissions (Paterson, 2014).
Within this context, there is a clear need for research into the adoption of collaborative 
carbon emission reduction (CCER) by companies working within supply chains. A number of 
studies have previously examined the impact of CCER on suppliers and manufacturers from 
various different perspectives based on classical game theory, i.e. order, inventory, the 
delivery process and investment in carbon reduction (e.g. Bazan et al., 2017; Hua et al., 2011; 
Jaber et al., 2013; Palak et al., 2014; Toptal et al., 2014; Wahab et al., 2011;). However, 
there has, to date, been a lack of research into the following issues: firstly, why individuals 
are motivated to obtain short-term payoffs during the process of CCER implementation by 
ignoring the interests of other members; and secondly, the methods they employ to evolve 
their strategies to focus on long-term benefits.   
This study attempts to fill this gap by drawing upon evolutionary game theory (EGT) to 
understand the initial configuration of multiple subjects in CCER implementation, as well as 
the ways payoff related factors (i.e. cost, additional benefits, investment risks and 
governmental subsidies) can influence CCER. In particular, with reference to the emerging 
phenomenon on CCER under the cap-and-trade programme in China, this research is 
intended to deepen understanding of the collaborative role in carbon emission reduction by 
answering the following three research questions:
RQ1: How does the initial configuration of multiple subjects influence the 
implementation of CCER? 
RQ2: How do various payoff-related factors influence the implementation of CCER?
RQ3: What is the role of governmental policy in facilitating CCER?
This paper offers a twofold contribution to the literature. Firstly, this study draws on EGT to 
identify how the initial proportion of strategic choice influences the implementation of CCER 
within supply chains. This identification can assist the government in understanding when to 
motivate firms to implement CCER and which factors are capable of influencing the efficacy 
of environmental policies. Secondly, the use of evolutionary game-theoretical analysis 
identifies the influence of factors related to cost and revenue on the implementation of CCER, 
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i.e. the initial carbon reduction investment and the operational fees related to collaboration. 
An examination of these factors can help firms decide whether or not to implement CCER, 
while also identifying on which factors to focus during a specific period of time. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses previous 
research in related fields. Section 3 provides an evolutionary game analysis of CCER, 
omitting the use of governmental subsidies. Section 4 examines the evolutionary direction 
and process of CCER when the government provides subsidies to focal companies. Section 5 
undertakes the discussion and Section 6 outlines the limitations and future direction of study. 
2. Related literature
As an effective method of improving the efficiency of carbon emission reduction, CCER has 
attracted considerable attention in the academic field. Existing studies on this regard can be 
divided into two streams: (1) double subject based CCER (Bazan et al., 2017; Chen et al., 
2013; Hua et al., 2016; Jaber et al., 2013; Manikas and Kroes, 2015; Toptal et al., 2014) and 
(2) multi-subject based CCER (Benjaafar et al., 2013; Glock and Kim, 2015; Nurjanni et al., 
2017; Peng and Shiang, 2014; Shiraki et al., 2016), of which the latter has a greater amount 
of related literature. The collaborative field of multi-subject based CCER does not limit the 
order cycle time or quantity, along with its production, emission reduction technology and 
new business models. In addition, this collaborative field can also be extended to: (1) the 
delivery process; (2) the location of suppliers; and (3) the choice of suitable partners.
2.1 Double subject based CCER
Prior research has explored how both upstream and downstream aspects can collaborate to 
reduce carbon emissions. For example, Chen et al. (2013) examined collaboration between 
suppliers and manufacturers to reduce their carbon emission costs without significantly 
increasing their overall cost. The study demonstrated the influence of various factors on the 
scale of emission reduction (i.e. operational adjustment; the tax rate; the level of emission 
penalties; and the carbon price), as well as the cost of various mechanisms, including carbon 
tax, cap-and-offset and cap-and-price. Hua et al. (2011; 2016) and Wahab et al. (2011) 
investigated how members within supply chains can reduce carbon emissions through the 
control of the order cycle time and quantity. Their results indicated that the frequency of 
orders tend to decrease, but, when the reduction of carbon emissions is taken into account, the 
optimal levels of orders can be seen to increase. 
    Jaber et al. (2013) established a two-echelon (i.e. vendor-buyer) supply chain model, 
containing a coordination mechanism to study members’ optimal decisions, in order to 
examine the effectiveness of different emission trading schemes. Their study revealed that 
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members of a supply chain can reach optimal production decisions under various different 
emission trading schemes. However, Toptal et al. (2014) and Dong et al. (2016) explored the 
collaborative investment of supply chain members into carbon reduction technology in 
different mechanisms. Toptal et al. (2014) found that members within the supply chain are 
more motivated to invest in environmental technologies containing tax or cap-and-trade 
policies than those subject to a cap policy. Similarly, Dong et al. (2016) claimed that the 
taking of joint decisions can assist supply chain members to reduce their production costs and 
increase their investment into carbon emission reduction technologies. Bazan et al. (2017) 
outlined how a manufacturer and a retailer remanufactured used items in a new VMI-CS 
coordination business model, identifying that the new collaboration model resulted in longer 
manufacturing and recovery times, but lower levels of emission and energy usage. 
    In summary, the above studies illustrate that carbon emissions can be effectively 
reduced through collaboration between an upstream and a downstream, and that the 
collaborative field could focus on: (1) the order cycle time (Manikas and Kroes 2015); (2) 
order quantity and production (Du et al., 2013; Zhang and Xu, 2013); (3) investment into 
emission reduction (Swami and Shah, 2013).
2.2 Multi-subject based CCER
CCER has also been investigated in supply chains constructed by a single upstream and 
multi-downstream, or multi-upstream and a single downstream. For example, Benjaafar et al. 
(2013) investigated how collaboration between firms within supply chains influences their 
costs and carbon emissions, as well as the benefits of investment into carbon efficient 
technologies. They found that, in comparison to individual initiatives for carbon emission 
reduction, multi-subject based CCER results in lower costs and a more visible impact. 
Chaabane et al. (2012) demonstrated that, within the setting of a global supply chain, there 
can be an effective reduction of carbon emissions resulting from production created by a 
collaboration between multiple subjects. In their study, a Mixed-integer Linear Program (MIP) 
assisted the manager with the adoption of optimal strategies in relation to differing carbon 
reduction mechanisms. 
Like the production process, the delivery process produces a large amount of carbon 
emissions, with transportation resulting in approximately 19% of global energy consumption, 
and 25% of energy-related carbon emissions (Palak et al., 2014). Some studies have 
investigated this phenomenon in terms of how supply chain members can reduce carbon 
emissions by improving their fuel efficiency, selecting suitable methods of transportation and 
vehicle routines, as well as optimal locations (Glock and Kim, 2015; Shiraki et al., 2016). In 
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general, local suppliers tend to be preferred when the cost of carbon reduction rises, along 
with higher levels of investment into carbon reduction technology. In addition, the 
effectiveness of carbon emission reduction can be influenced by a number of human related 
factors. It is therefore essential to put in place a decision support system for the selection of 
appropriate partners (i.e. suppliers, delivery companies and manufacturers), particularly as an 
optimal combination of partners can lead to a more efficient reduction in carbon emissions 
(Peng and Shiang, 2014). In addition, multi-subject based CCER contains a greater number of 
collaborative fields, i.e. the delivery process, the location of suppliers and the choice of 
suitable partners.
2.3 Aims of this study
The review of existing CCER literature has identified the existence of additional 
collaborative aspects to multi-subject based CCER. Such studies assume that all members of 
supply chains are motivated to implement CCER - this is inconsistent with conditions in the 
real world. Thus, some members of supply chains can lack awareness of the benefits of 
implementing CCER, due to being constrained by limited perceptual and computational 
capabilities (Shubik, 2002). Therefore, CCER is characterised by path dependence, i.e. 
companies can, over time, take a more professional approach to the adoption of CCER 
(Theißen et al., 2014). Furthermore, CCER has a strong positive externality, with all 
participants in a supply chain motivated to follow suit, namely, they are willing to enjoy the 
revenue from invest in CCER made by their fellow members. However, it appears that 
previous research in the field has neglected this factor. 
Recently, a number of studies have considered these issues by adopting EGT. Rather 
than focusing on the supply chain perspective, they have explored how two similar entities 
(e.g. air conditioner firms) can engage in a mutual gamble in adopting carbon reduction 
strategies (Zhao et al., 2016) and how governments gamble with firms to achieve optimal 
equilibrium in reducing carbon emissions (Wu et al., 2017). By contrast, this study analyses 
the implementation of CCER from the perspective of both the supply chain and EGT.
Table 1 makes a detailed comparison of existing research regarding CCER. It 
demonstrates that studies using the newsvendor, general game model and Economical 
Quantity Order (EOQ) model focus on double subject based CCER. However, studies 
employing Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) is concerned with a single upstream and 
multi-downstream, or multi-upstream and a single downstream based CCER. This current 
study differs from such previous studies in examining how multi-upstream and 
multi-downstream collaboratively manage carbon emissions over time. In addition, unlike 
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previous research separately exploring the economic and environmental optimisation of 
CCER (Chaabane et al., 2012; Du et al., 2013; Swami and Shah, 2013), this study has a 
concentration of both its economic and environmental optimisation. Furthermore, when it 
comes to the collaborative field, the focus of the study is on a number of aspects that have not 
previously been simultaneously explored: (1) revenue; (2) cost; (3) operational risk; and (4) 
investment into carbon reduction (See Table 1).
Insert Table 1 About Here
3. Evolutionary game analysis of CCER
Appendix A outlines the basic assumptions of evolutionary game analysis. The potential 
strategy for suppliers ( ) and manufacturers ( ) is assumed to consist of either cooperation 𝑆 𝑀
or non-cooperation. When manufacturers effectively undertake CCER (i.e. cooperation 
strategy), they share with their suppliers both energy conservation and emission reduction 
technologies, along with providing incentives for the reduction of carbon emissions. However, 
when manufacturers fail to implement CCER (i.e. non-cooperation strategy), they refuse to 
share energy conservation and emission reduction technologies, or to provide the necessary 
funds to encourage suppliers to increase their own investment into emission reduction 
technologies. 
Similarly, when suppliers cooperate with manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions (i.e. 
cooperation strategy), they choose to share carbon emission reduction technologies with their 
manufacturers and offer cooperation in setting up a collaborative mechanism to reduce 
carbon emissions. However, if the suppliers fail to adopt CCER (i.e. non-cooperation 
strategy), they refuse to share carbon emission reduction technologies with manufacturers and 
also lack any motivation to set up a collaborative mechanism to reduce emissions. 
Correspondingly, the suppliers are then unable to benefit from incentives from their 
manufacturers.
3.1 Pay off matrix
In the payoff matrix, and  form the normal payments made when suppliers and 𝜋𝑠 𝜋𝑀
manufacturers fail to implement CCER.  and  are the additional payments made ∆𝑉𝑆 ∆𝑉𝑀
when suppliers and manufacturers work together to reduce emissions. During the process of 
CCER implementation, suppliers and manufacturers have separate initial investment costs  𝐶𝑆
and . When both the suppliers and manufacturers select to implement CCER, they need to 𝐶𝑀
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separately pay the operational fees  and . Unlike suppliers, manufacturers are faced 𝐶𝑂𝑆  𝐶𝑂𝑀
with a direct burden from customers desiring them to demonstrate increased social 
responsibility. This motivates them to offer suppliers incentives to undertake additional 
investment in carbon emission reductions . Both manufacturers and suppliers should be (𝑆)
able to obtain revenue to cover the costs of the process of CCER implementation, i.e. the 
initial investment and the operational and incentive fees. Hence, the additional revenue is 
higher than investment in CCER, i.e.  and . The ∆𝑉𝑆 > 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆 ―𝑆  ∆𝑉𝑀 > 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐶𝑂𝑀 +𝑆
corresponding payoff matrix is presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 About Here
3.2. Revenue analysis of manufacturers and suppliers
1) Suppliers
When the suppliers  choose to reduce carbon emissions with manufacturers in a 𝑆
collaborative manner, the replicated dynamic equation of the suppliers is as follows: 
                        (1)
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑈𝑆1 ― 𝑈𝑆) = 𝛼(1 ― 𝛼)[(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆]
2) Manufacturers
When manufacturers fail to cooperate with suppliers, the replicated dynamic equation of 
manufacturers is as follows:
                    (2)
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑈𝑀1 ― 𝑈𝑀) = 𝛽(1 ― 𝛽)[(𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)𝛼 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀]
3.3 Stability analysis of equilibrium point
A simultaneous equation can be constructed using equations (1) and (2). The five systematic 
partial equilibriums are , , ,  and 𝑂(0,0) 𝐴(0,1) 𝐵(1,1) 𝐶(1,0)
.𝐷( 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆, 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆)
According to the assessment method provided by the Jacobian matrix, partial 
derivatives are taken for  and , with the Jacobian matrix subsequently presented in 
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡  𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑡
equation (3). The equilibrium points were further analysed using the Jacobian matrix. The 
analysis is shown in Table 3.
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    (3)𝐽 = [(1 ― 2𝛼)[(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆] 𝛼(1 ― 𝛼)(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽(1 ― 𝛽)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀) (1 ― 2𝛽)[(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀]]
Insert Table 3 About Here
The analysis of the five equilibrium points reveals that the partial equilibrium point 𝐷(
 depends on the following four factors: (1) the initial status of 
𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀
∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆, 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆)
the evolutionary game system; (2) the risk of loss; (3) initial investment and (4) additional 
payment of CCER.  and  (i.e. (Non-cooperation, Non-cooperation) and 𝑂(0,0)  𝐵(1,1)
(Cooperation, Cooperation)) form two equilibrium points. Specifically, when the system 
reaches an evolutionary endpoint, this results in two possible outcomes from the final strategy 
adopted by both suppliers and manufacturers: (1) they all implement CCER, or (2) none of 
them implements CCER. 
Equations (1) and (2) can separately obtain the phase image for suppliers and 
manufacturers. For suppliers: Firstly, the choice of cooperation strategy depends on the initial 
proportion of manufacturers whose strategy is cooperation ( ). Secondly, when the initial 𝛽
proportion  is higher than , all suppliers will finally choose the cooperation 𝛽
𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆
∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆
strategy (See Fig. 1(a)). If  is lower than , all the suppliers will prefer the 𝛽
𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆
∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆
non-cooperation strategy (See Fig. 1 (b)). Finally, when  is equal to , the 𝛽
𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆
∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆
suppliers may choose either a cooperation or non-cooperation strategy (See Fig.1(c)).
Similarly, when it comes to manufacturers, the motivation to choose a cooperation 
strategy depends on the initial proportion of suppliers whose strategy is that of cooperation 
( ). When  is higher than , all manufacturers are inclined to choose the 𝛼 𝛼
𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀
∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆
cooperation strategy (See Fig. 2(a)). However, if  is lower than , they tend 𝛼
𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀
∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆
to choose the non-cooperation strategy (See Fig. 2(b)). Finally, when  is equal to 𝛼
, manufacturers may select either a cooperation or non-cooperation strategy 
𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀
∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆
(See Fig. 2(c)).
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Insert Fig. 1 About Here
Insert Fig. 2 About Here
3.4 Factor analysis of CCER
This study provides a number of numerical examples to illustrate the mechanism of CCER, 
indicating how suppliers and manufacturers adopt CCER strategies under different 
circumstances. More specifically, there is an examination of the impact on the evolutionary 
process of CCER on: (1) different initial proportions of CCER implementation; (2) 
operational costs; (3) investment risks; (4) additional revenue; and (5) incentives.
In all numerical examples, the evolutionary time period is set as , and the initial  [0, 100]
numerical values are separately set as:
, , , , ,  and . (0.7,0.1)  (0.4,0.5)  (0.6,0.4)  (0.9,0.1)  (0.1,0.7)  (0.4,0.6)  (0.1,0.9)
The other values are set as: 
, , , , , , , , , ∆𝑉𝑆 = 7 𝐶𝑆 = 1 𝐶𝑂𝑆 = 3 𝑅𝑆 = 2 ∆𝑉𝑀 = 9.5 𝑆 = 0.3 𝐶𝑀 = 1.2 𝐶𝑂𝑀 = 3.5 𝑅𝑀 = 1.5
. 𝑅𝑆 = 2
In this section, Fig. 3, Fig. 5, and Fig. 7 are evolutionary game sketches. Fig. 4, Fig. 6, Fig. 8, 
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 form the corresponding numerical examples.
Fig. 3 is the initial evolutionary game-theoretical sketch, in which the other values (i.e.  
,    ,    and ) do not change. Fig. 4 shows how the ∆𝑉𝑆,  𝐶𝑆 𝐶𝑂𝑆, 𝑅𝑆, ∆𝑉𝑀, 𝑆 𝐶𝑀, 𝐶𝑂𝑀, 𝑅𝑀 𝑅𝑆
different initial proportions influence the evolutionary direction to the point  or 𝑂(0,0)  𝐵
. In Fig. 4, the horizontal axis and vertical axis are separately represented by  and , (1,1) 𝛼 𝛽
demonstrating how different initial proportions evolve to equilibrium point  or 𝑂(0,0)  𝐵
.(1,1)
Insert Fig. 3 About Here
Insert Fig. 4 About Here
As shown in Fig. 4, the coordinate point side (i.e.  and ) to the left of (0.7,0.1) (0.1,0.7)
the saddle point  evolves to the equilibrium point . However, the initial 𝐷(0.38,0.48) 𝑂(0,0)
value (i.e. , , ,  and ) to the right side of the  (0.4,0.5)  (0.6,0.4)  (0.9,0.1) (0.4,0.6)  (0.1,0.9)
saddle point evolves to the equilibrium point . Thus, the evolutionary path relies on 𝐵(1,1)
the initial proportion of how many of the individuals within supply chains implement CCER, 
i.e. the greater the initial proportion, the higher the potential for the evolutionary path to end 
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up at the equilibrium point (Cooperation, Cooperation), while the smaller the initial 
proportion, the higher the possibility for the evolutionary path to end up at the equilibrium 
point (Non-cooperation, Non-cooperation). 
Fig. 5 demonstrates how a change in operational costs  and  influences the 𝐶𝑂𝑆 𝐶𝑂𝑀
evolutionary path of CCER. When there is an increase in both operation costs  and , 𝐶𝑂𝑆 𝐶𝑂𝑀
the denominator of the longitudinal and vertical saddle point also increases in comparison 
with the saddle point in Fig. 3. Fig. 6 demonstrates that when parameters such as the initial 
proportion and time period remain unchanged, but  are changed to 𝐶𝑂𝑆 = 3 and  𝐶𝑂𝑀 = 3.5
, the original saddle point  increases to 𝐶𝑂𝑆 = 3.5 and  𝐶𝑂𝑀 = 4 𝐷(0.38,0.48)  𝐷
. In this case, the area of ABCD decreases and the area of ADCO increases, (0.403,0.517)
resulting in greater difficulties when it comes to the implementation of CCER. To illustrate, 
the point , which previously evolved to , now evolves to  (See Fig.  (0.4,0.5) 𝐵(1,1) 𝑂(0,0)
6). The change of evolutionary path reveals the increased difficulties to establish agreement 
between suppliers and manufacturers on CCER when there is an increase in its operational 
cost of implementation (See Fig. 6).
Insert Fig. 5 About Here
Insert Fig. 6 About Here
Figure 7 further explores the impact of additional revenue  and  on the ∆𝑉𝑀 ∆𝑉𝑆
evolutionary path of CCER. When there is an increase in additional revenue  and , ∆𝑉𝑀 ∆𝑉𝑆
there is a decrease in the denominator of the longitudinal and vertical saddle point, as shown 
in Fig. 7. As in the analysis given in the second part of this section, all values remain 
unchanged, apart from  and  becomes  and . In this ∆𝑉𝑆 = 7 ∆𝑉𝑀 = 9.5 ∆𝑉𝑆 = 7.5 ∆𝑉𝑀 = 1
case, the saddle point  decreases to . Correspondingly, the area 𝐷(0.38,0.48)  𝐷(0.213,0.254)
 increases and the area  decreases, resulting in a lowering of the difficulties 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐷 𝐴𝑂𝐶𝐷
when it comes to the implementation of CCER. Fig. 8 demonstrates the initial proportion, 
such as  and , which previously evolved to , now evolving to (0.7,0.1)  (0.1,0.7) 𝑂(0,0) 𝐵
. This leads to the conclusion that it is easier for all members of supply chains to (1,1)
implement CCER when extra revenues  and  are higher.∆𝑉𝑀 ∆𝑉𝑆
Insert Fig. 7 About Here
Insert Fig. 8 About Here
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Finally, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 present the impact on the evolutionary path of CCER of 
different incentive coefficients . To assist suppliers in implementing a cooperation (𝑆)
strategy, manufacturers have the facility to provide suppliers with subsidies. In this numerical 
example, other parameters remain unchanged, apart from the incentive coefficient S. 
Fig. 9 demonstrates the evolutionary path of CCER as implemented by manufacturers. In 
Fig. 9, the initial proportion of CCER implemented by suppliers and manufacturers is set as 
0.45, the initial value of  is set as 0.3, the time period and step length are separately set as 𝑆
 and 0.01. Over time, despite all the suppliers and manufacturers implementing [0, 100]
CCER at the endpoint, it takes less time for all manufacturers to choose a cooperation 
strategy when  than it does when . However, when , the increased  𝑆 = 0.3 𝑆 = 1   𝑆 = 3.5
incentive coefficient decreases the manufacturers’ motivation to implement CCER, due to 
their revenue being greatly reduced by the exorbitant incentive.
Fig.10 illustrates how the incentive provided by manufacturers influences suppliers’ 
decisions concerning CCER, including how the increase of incentives over a certain interval 
can motivate suppliers to implement CCER. To illustrate, it takes suppliers less time to adopt 
a CCER strategy when  than it does when . However, when , suppliers   𝑆 = 1 𝑆 = 0.3   𝑆 = 3
tend to choose a non-cooperation strategy. A comparison between Fig.10 and Fig.9 indicates 
that the proportion of suppliers choosing a cooperation strategy increases to its highest point 
before declining sharply to zero. This is due to higher incentive costs resulting in a lack of 
motivation among manufacturers to implement CCER. When there is a decline in the 
proportion of a cooperation strategy adopted by manufacturers, suppliers experience 
additional difficulties in receiving incentives and, thus also tend to adopt a non-cooperation 
strategy. Therefore, an exorbitant incentive provided by manufacturers negatively affects 
CCER implementation over the long term.
Insert Fig. 9 About Here
Insert Fig. 10 About Here
4. Evolutionary analysis of governmental participation
Environmental regulations implemented by the government are always directly in control of 
the focal company, as this influences the entire supply chain (Gurtoo and Antony, 2007). The 
focal company is therefore established as a positive example, encouraging all members 
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within the supply chain to develop emission reduction technologies. A complete 
governmental incentive system is essential to ensure all members of supply chains implement 
CCER (Borg et al., 2006), while the government can also provide subsidies to focal 
companies in order to promote the implementation of CCER within supply chains. This study 
covers the general aspect of this issue, while at the same time considering manufacturers as 
the focal companies.
4.1. Basic model assumption
A payoff matrix was initially constructed (see Table 4). According to the basic model 
assumption, the government provides subsidies to the focal companies implementing CCER, 
with the motivation p rameter  being:𝑤
,  and .𝑤 < 𝜋𝑀 ∆𝑉𝑆 > 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆 ―𝑆 ∆𝑉𝑀 > 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐶𝑂𝑀 +𝑆
Insert Table 4 About Here
4.2. The payment analysis of subjects
1) Suppliers
When one considers the conditions in which the government provides subsidies, the 
duplication dynamical equation model for suppliers  is:𝑆
                       (4)
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑈𝑆1 ― 𝑈𝑆) = 𝛼(1 ― 𝛼)[(Δ𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆]
2) Manufacturers
By the same token, the duplication dynamical equation model for manufacturers  is:M
               (5)
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑈𝑀1 ― 𝑈𝑀) = 𝛽(1 ― 𝛽)[(𝛥𝑉𝑀 + 𝑊 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)𝛼 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀]
3) The stability point analysis of the model
In comparison to the condition in which there is no consideration of the subsidy provided by 
the government, the duplication dynamic equation in this section holds a number of 
similarities with the equation in Section 3.2. The construction of a simultaneous equational 
model for equations (4) and (5) reveals the following five systematic partial equilibriums:
 , , , and . 𝑂(0,0) 𝐴(0,1) 𝐵(1,1) 𝐶(1,0) 𝐷( 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 + 𝑤 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆, 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆)
Similarly,  and  (i.e. (Non-cooperation, Non-cooperation) and 𝑂(0,0) 𝐵(1,1)
(Cooperation, Cooperation)) form two equilibrium points. When equilibrium is reached in the 
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evolutionary game system, either all suppliers and manufacturers implement CCER or none 
implements CCER. 
4.3. The factor analysis of CCER
A numerical example is also included in this section, in order to illustrate how governmental 
policy influences the mechanism of CCER. In Fig. 11, the horizontal coordinates and vertical 
coordinates are respectively represented by the initial proportion  and , and 𝛼 = 0.5 𝛽 = 0.3
the motivational parameter  (Line 1),  (Line 2),  (Line 3) and  𝑤 = 0   𝑤 = 0.5  𝑤 = 1 𝑤 = 2
(Line 4). 
When the government fails to provide subsidies for the focal company ( ), the final 𝑤 = 0
equilibrium is (Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation) (i.e., point )). When this occurs, (0,0
none of the members within the supply chain will, over time, cooperate to reduce carbon 
emissions (See Line 1 in Fig. 11). However, when the government provides a level of subsidy 
to the focal company ( ), the strategic choice of suppliers and manufacturers still 𝑤 = 0.5
evolves to point  (Line 2 in Fig. 11). The evolutionary speed of Line 2 is slower in  (0,0)
comparison to Line 1 (i.e. Line 2 is longer than Line 1). When the government further 
increases the incentive level ( ), the strategic choice of suppliers and manufacturers 𝑤 = 1
change to (Cooperation, Cooperation) (i.e. point (1, 1)). In this case, all suppliers and 
manufacturers ultimately implement CCER. When the government further increases the 
incentive level ( ), the strategic choice of suppliers and manufacturers will reach the 𝑤 = 2
point (Cooperation, Cooperation) more rapidly than when the incentive level  is 1 (i.e. 𝑤
Line 4 is shorter than Line 3).
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that, when the initial status in the 
evolutionary game system is unable to motivate all suppliers and manufacturers to implement 
CCER, governmental subsidies can change the evolutionary direction and motivate all 
members of  supply chains to implement CCER.
Insert Fig. 11 About Here
5. Discussion and conclusion
This study has employed the evolutionary model to examine the influence of the initial 
proportion of strategic choice, cost, additional benefit and the investment risk of CCER on its 
implementation. It has used evolutionary game-theoretical sketches and numerical examples 
to illustrate the implementation of CCER. In addition, it has discussed the circumstances 
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under which the government motivates focal companies to implement CCER. It has also 
determined differing results to that found in existing CCER literature, as discussed below.
Firstly, the ultimate decision of suppliers and manufacturers to adopt a CCER strategy is 
greatly influenced by the initial configuration of multiple subjects. Thus, all members of 
supply chains ultimately choose a non-cooperation strategy when the initial proportion of 
CCER implementation is on the left side of the saddle point 𝐷
 (See figs. 3 and 4). However, all members of the supply ( 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆, 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆)
chains will eventually choose a cooperation strategy when the initial proportion is on the right 
side of the saddle point. This result differs from studies investigating multi-subject based 
CCER (Nurjanni et al., 2017; Shiraki et al., 2016), which consider that the optimal strategic 
choice of supply chain members is unchanged over time.
Secondly, an improvement in operational costs results in an increase in the denominator 
of longitudinal and vertical saddle points, leading to members of the supply chain 
experiencing greater difficulties in selecting a cooperation strategy. Furthermore, the 
denominator of the longitudinal and vertical saddle point decreases when there is an 
improvement in additional revenues, facilitating members of the supply chain to implement 
CCER (See Figs. 7 and 8). This finding is similar to the result of the study investigating 
double subject based CCER (Bazan et al., 2017; Hua et al., 2016). Although these studies are 
set in the context of an upstream and a downstream lacking any learning characteristics, they 
also demonstrate that the implementation of CCER proves simpler in the presence of a lower 
operation cost, combined with a greater level of additional revenue brought by CCER.
Thirdly, manufacturers need to be cautious when subsidising suppliers during the 
implementation of CCER. Although high levels of subsidy can, over the short term, motivate 
suppliers to adopt cooperative strategies, these do not necessarily lead to the establishment of 
long-term collaboration (See Figs. 9 and 10). Hence, the subsidies provided by focal 
companies should attempt to make the saddle point posit on the right side of the initial 
proportions, in order to encourage members of the supply chain to adopt CCER in a both 
effective and efficient manner. This will prevent supply chain members evolving to the point 
at which they all adopt a non-cooperation strategy. This finding is partially supported by the 
existing CCER literature, owing to the fact that exorbitant subsidies are seldom investigated 
(Dong et al., 2017; Swami and Shah, 2013; Xia et al., 2018). 
Finally, the decision of whether firms choose to employ a strategy of cooperation is 
strongly dependent on the nature of the policy put forward by the government. When the 
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initial status of the evolutionary game model evolves to where suppliers and manufacturers 
are disinclined to adopt cooperation strategies, the subsidies provided by the government can 
alter the evolutionary direction, motivating (or speeding up) the adoption of CCER by 
manufacturers and suppliers. This finding diverges from the conclusions reached by prior 
studies (e.g. Dong et al., 2017; Manikas, et al., 2015; Swami and Shah, 2013; Xia et al., 
2018), i.e. that the members of the supply chain are able to cooperate in the face of changing 
policies.
The above findings have significant implications, both practical and theoretical. From 
practical perspective, this research can assist firms within supply chains to identify the factors 
they need to consider when deciding whether to adopt the CCER strategy, such as initial 
investment, operational cost, extra payment of CCER and how many firms within the supply 
chain currently implement CCER. The consideration of these factors can help firms 
determine which carbon reduction strategy to adopt over different time periods. Additionally, 
the results obtained from the analysis can assist policy makers in identifying the most salient 
factors influencing the implementation of CCER. This can, however, help the government 
tailor the policy in favor of CCER. From theoretical perspective, the numerical example 
above highlights that motivating multiple members of supply chains to cooperate carbon 
emission reduction is not confined to factors such as operational cost, potential revenue and 
incentives. The initial proportion of members whose strategy is cooperation, and the average 
revenue of those adopting CCER, also play a notable role in the process of strategic diffusion. 
The consideration of these factors is conducive to improving the accuracy of the analysis 
concerning CCER. 
6. Limitations and directions for future research
As an initial investigation into how multi-supplier and multi-manufacturer collaborate to 
reduce carbon emissions, this study has the limitation and therefore has the potential to be 
extended in three directions. 
Firstly, due to the aim of this research being an exploration of the mechanism of CCER, 
there is no detailed analysis of its relevant parameters, i.e. operational costs, investment risks, 
additional revenue, and incentives. Therefore, in order to ensure the greater usability of this 
model, functions pertaining to the relevant parameters could be further specified and then 
introduced to the model.
Secondly, a systematic review of the existing literature regarding CCER has revealed an 
absence of the investigation from an empirical perspective. It could therefore prove beneficial 
to empirically test the efficiency of CCER and explore the cooperation between members 
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within supply chains aimed at reducing their carbon footprint. 
Thirdly, it would also be beneficial to compare CCER practices in a number of different 
countries, in order to assist the government in selecting more suitable policies. This study 
explores the CCER issue with reference to the cap-and-trade programme launched in China. 
Given different policies taken in different countries, a comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of carbon reduction in different contexts would provide governments with more 
rational decision making.
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Table 1 The comparison of existing studies
Number of Subjects
Upstream Downstream
Methodology Combination or Separation
(Economic and environmental 
optimization)?
Collaborative Field Paper
Newsvendor 
model
Separation / Combination
Revenue, Order and emission 
reduction investment
Du et al. (2013); Manikas and Kroes 
(2014); Dong et al. (2016)
General game 
model
Separation / Combination
Revenue, Order, production and 
carbon reduction investment
Swami and Shah (2013) ; Xia et al. (2018)
Single Single
EOQ Combination
Cost, order, production, inventory 
and new business model
Wahab et al. (2011); Hua et al. (2011); 
Jaber et al. (2013); Toptal et al. (2014); 
Bazan et al. (2017)
Multi/Single Single/ Multi MIP Separation / Combination
Revenue, Cost, location, carbon 
reduction investment, delivery 
process and selection of partners
Chaabane et al. (2012); Benjaafar et al. 
(2013); Palak et al. (2014); Glock and Kim 
(2017); Nurjanni et al. (2017); Zhang and 
Xu (2013); Shiraki et al. (2016)
Multi Multi EGT Combination
Revenue, cost, operational risk 
and carbon reduction investment
This study 
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Table 2 The payoff functions of different strategies
M
Cooperation Non-cooperationP
𝛽 1 ― 𝛽
Cooperation 𝛼 ,(𝜋𝑠 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 +∆𝑉𝑆 +𝑆  𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 +∆𝑉𝑀 ―𝑆) (𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆,𝜋𝑀)
S
Non-cooperation 1 ― 𝛼 (𝜋𝑆,𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀) (𝜋𝑆,𝜋𝑀)
Table 3 The stability analysis of evolutionary game
Equilibriums 𝒅𝒆𝒕(𝑱) 𝒕𝒓(𝑱) Outcomes
𝑂(0,0) (C𝑆 + R𝑆)(C𝑀 + R𝑀) + ― C𝑆 ― C𝑀 ― Rj𝑆 ― R𝑀 - ESS
𝐴(0,1) (∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆)(𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀) +  ∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 +𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 + Not stable
𝐵(1,1)  (∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 +𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ―𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀) +  C𝑂𝑆 + 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝐶𝑀 ―∆𝑉𝑀 ―∆𝑉𝑆 - ESS
𝐶(1,0) (𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀) +  ∆V𝑀 + C𝑆 + R𝑆 ― C𝑂𝑀 ―S ― C𝑀 + Not stable
Table 4 The evolutionary game analysis of collaborative emission reduction
M
Cooperation Non-cooperationP
𝛽 1 ― 𝛽
Cooperation 𝛼 (𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝛥𝑉𝑆 + 𝑆,𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑤) (𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆,𝜋𝑀)
S
Non-cooperation 1 ― 𝛼 (𝜋𝑆,𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀) (𝜋𝑆,𝜋𝑀)
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(a)𝛽 > 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆 (b)𝛽 < 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆 (c)𝛽 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆
Fig.1 Phase image of suppliers
(a)𝛼 > 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆 (b)𝛼 < 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆 (c)𝛼 = 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆
Fig.2 Phase image of manufacturers
Fig. 3 The plane coordinate map of 
CCER evolutionary game
Fig. 4 The numerical example of CCER 
evolutionary game
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Fig. 5 The plane coordinate map of CCER 
evolutionary game
Fig. 6 The numerical example of CCER 
evolutionary game
Fig. 7 The plane coordinate map of 
CCER evolutionary game
Fig.8 The numerical example of CCER 
evolutionary game
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Fig. 9 Different incentive coefficients on 
the evolutionary path of manufacturers
Fig. 10 Different incentive coefficients on 
the evolutionary path of suppliers
Fig. 11 The evolutionary analysis under different motivation strengths
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Appendix A
There are four basic assumptions to EGT: 
1. Populations: multi-participants can be found in the biological and social system, 
each with its own set of actions; 
2. Pay off function - every action has a corresponding payoff; 
3. Dynamics - the learning and imitating procedure should be revealed; and 
4. Equilibrium - the evolution will converge to a stable state. 
In addition, two core conceptions are included in EGT, i.e. the Evolutionary Stable 
Strategy (ESS) and Replicator Dynamics (RD). The former reveals the stable strategy 
set and the latter demonstrates the process of reaching stability. The ESS obeys two 
conditions: the first one is , and the second is∀𝑠, 𝑢(𝑠 ∗ , 𝑠) ≤ 𝑢(𝑠 ∗ ,𝑠 ∗ )  ∀𝑠 ∗ ≠ 𝑠, 𝑢
. The , and  are the original strategy, (𝑠,𝑠 ∗ ) = 𝑢(𝑠 ∗ ,𝑠 ∗ )→𝑢(𝑠 ∗ , 𝑠) < 𝑢(𝑠 ∗ ,𝑠 ∗ ) 𝑠 ∗  𝑠  𝑢
the mutation strategy, and the payoff formula. The RD is . 𝜃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖(𝑡)[𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖) ― 𝑢𝑡]
Proof of Equation. (1)
When suppliers choose to cooperate with manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, 
the payment formula for the suppliers is:
                    (A.1)                    𝑈𝑆1 = 𝛽(𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝛥𝑉𝑆 + 𝑆) + (1 ― 𝛽)(𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆)
    When suppliers refuse to cooperate with manufacturers, the suppliers’ payment 
formula is:
                                              (A.2)𝑈𝑆2 = 𝛽𝜋𝑆 + (1 ― 𝛽)𝜋𝑆 = 𝜋𝑆
Then the expected payment formula for suppliers  is:𝑆
          (A.3)             𝑈𝑆 = 𝛼𝑈𝑆1 + (1 ― 𝛼)𝑈𝑆2 = 𝛼𝛽(𝛥𝑉𝑆 + 𝑆 ―   𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆) ―𝛼(𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆) + 𝜋𝑆
Then we take equation (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) into the formulas ,  𝑑𝛼𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑈𝑆1 ― 𝑈𝑆)
we obtain equation (1).
Proof of Equation. (2)
When manufacturers choose to cooperate with suppliers to reduce carbon emissions, 
the manufacturers’ payment formula is:
                (A.4)                  𝑈𝑀1 = 𝛼(𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝑆) +(1 ― 𝛼)(𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀)
When manufacturers fail to cooperate with suppliers, the payment formula for 
manufacturers is：
                                            (A.5)                                           𝑈𝑀2 = 𝛼𝜋𝑀 + (1 ― 𝛼)𝜋𝑀 = 𝜋𝑀
Therefore, the expected payment formula for manufacturers is:(𝑀) 
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      (A.6)        𝑈𝑀 = 𝛽𝑈𝑀1 + (1 ― 𝛽)𝑈𝑀2 = 𝛼𝛽(𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀) ―𝛽(𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀) + 𝜋𝑀
Then we take equations (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) into the formula ,  𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑈𝑀1 ― 𝑈𝑀)
and we obtain equation (2).
Proof of the Jacobi equation (3)
Note that equation (1) and equation (2) form the separately replicated dynamic 
equation of suppliers and replicated dynamic equation of manufacturers. By taking the 
first derivative of equation (1), we have: 
                            (A.7)                         
𝑑2𝛼
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛼 = (1 ― 2𝛼)[(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆]
                                       (A.8)           
𝑑2𝛼
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛽 = 𝛼(1 ― 𝛼)(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 +𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)
By taking the first deriv tive of equation (2), we further have
                                     (A.9)                                  
𝑑2𝛽
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛼 = 𝛽(1 ― 𝛽)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ―𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)
                          (A.10)                         
𝑑2𝛽
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛽 = (1 ― 2𝛽)[(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀]
According to equation (A.7), equation (A.8), equation (A.9), equation (A.10) and the 
formulas of Jacobi ( ), we have the equation (3).𝐽 = [ 𝑑2𝛼𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛼 𝑑2𝛼𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛽𝑑2𝛽
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛼
𝑑2𝛽
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝛽
]
Proof of saddle point
When  is not equal to 0 and 1, we make equation (A.1) equal to 0. We have:𝛼
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑈𝑆1 ― 𝑈𝑆) = 𝛼(1 ― 𝛼)[(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)𝛽 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆] = 0
    When  is not equal to 0 and 1, we make equation (A.4) equal to 0. We have:𝛽
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑈𝑀1 ― 𝑈𝑀) = 𝛽(1 ― 𝛽)[(𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑅𝑀)𝛼 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀] = 0
According to the conditions provided above,  is equal to , and  𝛽
𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆
∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆 𝛼
is equal to . Then we further have the saddle point 
𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀
∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆 𝐷( 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 ― 𝑆,
.
𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆
∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑆)
Proof of 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝐽)
When  and  are equal to 0, we have: 𝛼 𝛽 | ―C𝑆 ― R𝑆 00 ―C𝑀 ― R𝑀| = (C𝑆 + R𝑆)(C𝑀 +R𝑀)
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When  is equal to 0 and  is equal to 1, we have:𝛼 𝛽|∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 00 ― (∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ― 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀)| = (∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 +𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀
.―𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀)
When  is equal to1 and  is equal to 1, we have:𝛼 𝛽
. When  is | ―(∆𝑉𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆) 00 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀| = (𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 ―𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀) 𝛼
equal to1 and  is equal to 0, we have: 𝛽 |𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆 00 𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀| = (𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆)(∆𝑉𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀
.―𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑀)
According to the four equations above, we get .𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝐽)
Proof of Equation (4)
When suppliers choose to cooperate with manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, 
the payment formula for suppliers is:
                   (A.11)                   𝑈𝑆1 = 𝛽(𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝛥𝑉𝑆 + 𝑆) +(1 ― 𝛽)(𝜋𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑆 ― 𝑅𝑆)
    When suppliers refuse to cooperate with manufacturers, the supplies’ payment 
formula is:
                                             (A.12)                                 𝑈𝑆2 = 𝛽𝜋𝑆 + (1 ― 𝛽)𝜋𝑆 = 𝜋𝑆
    Then the expected payment function of suppliers  is:𝑆
         (A.13)        𝑈𝑆 = 𝛼𝑈𝑆1 + (1 ― 𝛼)𝑈𝑆2 = 𝛼𝛽(𝛥𝑉𝑆 + 𝑆 ―   𝐶𝑂𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆) ― 𝛼(𝐶𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆) + 𝜋𝑆
Then we take equation (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) into the formulas 𝑑𝛼𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼
, we obtain equation (4).(𝑈𝑆1 ― 𝑈𝑆)
Proof of Equation (5)
When manufacturers choose to cooperate with suppliers to reduce carbon 
emissions, the manufacturers’ payment formula is:
           (A.14)           𝑈𝑀1 = 𝛼(𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝑆 + 𝑊) + (1 ― 𝛼)(𝜋𝑀 ― 𝐶𝑀 ― 𝑅𝑀)
When manufacturers fail to cooperate with suppliers, the payment function of 
manufacturers is：
                                           (A.15)                 𝑈𝑀2 = 𝛼𝜋𝑀 + (1 ― 𝛼)𝜋𝑀 = 𝜋𝑀
Therefore, the expected payment formula for manufacturers  is:𝑀
 (A.16)      𝑈𝑀 = 𝛽𝑈𝑀1 + (1 ― 𝛽)𝑈𝑀2 = 𝛼𝛽(𝛥𝑉𝑀 ― 𝑆 ― 𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀 + 𝑊) ― 𝛽(𝐶𝑀 + 𝑅𝑀) + 𝜋𝑀
Then we take equations (A.14), (A.15) and (A.16) into the formula 𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽
, and we obtain equation (5).(𝑈𝑀1 ― 𝑈𝑀)
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